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Abstract
This paper introduces product-level regulation as a new driver of informality and diversification
in a model of heterogeneous multi-product firms and endogenous product choice. Firms face
regulations at both the firm- and product-level and may comply with or evade either regula-
tion. The model suggests that firm-level regulation directly causes informality by deterring firm
registration. However, the product-level regulation has two effects: it directly drives product
informality as evasion of product regulation leading to informality within the formal sector and
indirectly deters firms from registering. Further, I demonstrate that the Gini coefficient and
Herfindahl index can be implemented in multi-product firm models as revenue-based measures
of product diversification. Contrary to the prediction of the commonly used product scope, the
revenue-based measures indicate informal firms to be more diversified than formal firms.
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“The transition from informal to formal enterprise status is also
gradual; indeed, single firms [...] can carry out some activities
informally and others formally at the same time.”
de Beer et al. (2013, p. 13)
1 Introduction
The extant theoretical literature employs a dichotomous definition of informality: firms either
comply with or evade regulations such as firm registration or taxation.1 However, in reality firms
face a multitude of regulations, and informality is a multi-dimensional concept. A recent study
by the World Intellectual Property Organization on the traditional medicine practitioner (TMP)
industry in Ghana, where informality accounts for about 40% of the country’s GDP (Schneider
et al., 2010), highlights this. It notes, “[e]ven though there is a significantly high level of business
registration among the TMPs - and this is done in conformity to the legal requirements for practicing
- the level of formalization of their business was limited.” (Essegbey et al. (2014, p. 15)) More
specifically, while 67% of surveyed TMPs had registered their business, only 52% had registered at
least one of their products with the Food and Drugs Authority, a legal requirement in Ghana.
The empirical literature provides evidence on four drivers of these different types of informality
and the product choice of firms. First, firm-level regulations that are costly to comply with deter
firm registration and accordingly drive informal sector participation at the firm-level, as found in
the seminal work of de Soto (1989).2 Second, in a similar fashion, product market regulations
drive firm-level informality (Loayza et al., 2005). Third, in the case of Ghana where registered,
and hence formal, firms did not register some of their products, product-level regulation matters:
Ghana’s TMPs state “the cumbersome nature of the registration procedures and the fees charged
being too high” (Essegbey et al. (2014, p. 2)) as the reasons for the evasion of regulation and hence
informality at the product-level. Fourth, product-level costs and regulation have been found to be
determinants of firms’ product choices in the recent literature on multi-product firms (Bernard et al.,
2010; Goldberg et al., 2010), and consequently informal firms seem to be less diversified than formal
firms (CIEM, 2012).3 This indicates two things. First, multiple policies impact firms at different
levels and accordingly their product choice and informality decision. Second, there exists not just an
informal sector, but also informality within the formal sector in the form of unregistered products
1This literature considers, for instance, the effect of informality on unemployment (Fields, 1975), size dualism
(Rauch, 1991), quality dualism (Banerji and Jain, 2007), contractual dualism (Basu et al., 2011) and trade liberal-
ization (Becker, 2014).
2Several subsequent papers confirm firm registration cost and complex registration procedures as main drivers of
informality (Djankov et al., 2002; Auriol and Warlters, 2005; Antunes and de V. Cavalcanti, 2007; Ulyssea, 2010).
3Other key findings from this literature are the connection of firm productivity with product scope and diver-
sification (Schoar, 2002; Iacovone and Javorcik, 2008; Bernard et al., 2009, 2010), adjustment of product scope and
scale of firms upon trade liberalization (Feenstra and Ma, 2007; Baldwin and Gu, 2009; Arkolakis and Muendler,
2010; Eckel and Neary, 2010; Bernard et al., 2011; Mayer et al., 2011; Nocke and Yeaple, 2013) and the importance
of within-firm distribution of resources among products as drivers of aggregate output of an economy (Bernard et al.,
2010; Goldberg et al., 2010; Navarro, 2012; So¨derbom and Weng, 2012).
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produced by registered firms. Given the focus of the extant theoretical informality literature on only
firm-level regulation and as no model to date captures all the aforementioned empirical facts, the
effect of firm- and product-level regulations jointly require further scrutinity. Therefore, I develop
a model of heterogeneous multi-product firms that endogenizes product choice and informality at
both the product- and firm-level to answer two questions: What are the impacts of both firm- and
product-level regulations on informality? How does product-level regulation impact firms’ product
choice and diversification in the presence of informality?
This model, along the lines of Bernard et al. (2010), provides a tractable setup to answer these
questions and consists of four core components. First, firms are heterogeneous in productivity and,
conditional on firm productivity, are characterized by heterogeneous skills in the production of a
continuum of goods. Second, firms are exposed to both firm- and product-level regulation and
firms’ decision on whether to comply with or evade regulation occurs at two levels. Informality
at the firm-level is defined to be firm registration non-compliance. Similarly, informality at the
product-level is defined to be product registration non-compliance. This allows for registered,
and hence formal, firms that may produce goods informally by evading product-level regulation
corresponding to Essegbey et al. (2014).4 Third, formality decisions at both levels are made under
the consideration of the costs and benefits of formality and informality. Firms operate rationally
and informality at both levels is therefore an entrepreneurial choice (e.g. de Mel et al., 2013;
La Porta and Shleifer, 2014). Fourth, in line with the empirical diversification literature, the model
features three indicators of product diversification to examine firms’ product choice: product scope,
a Product-Gini and a product-level Herfindahl index.5
The model results suggest that in addition to firm-level regulation, product-level regulation is
also an important driver of informality. While firm-level regulation has a direct effect on firms’
decision to register their business, an increase in the cost to comply with the product-level regulation
incentivizes firms to informalize along two dimensions. First, higher product regulation cost has a
direct effect in making the production of goods in compliance with registration requirements more
costly and leads to fewer registered goods. Second, an increase in this cost has an indirect effect
by decreasing the profitability of registering a business, and therein having the option to produce
registered goods.
Furthermore, the model highlights the effect of product-level regulation on firms’ product choice
and diversification. In terms of product scope, i.e. the number of distinct products produced by
4The complete evasion of product registration of informal firms seems particularly fitting for Ghana’s TMP, given
that the sector, as described in Essegbey et al. (2014), was originally entirely informal.
5The empirical literature on multi-product firms and international trade commonly measures diversification by
product scope, that is the number of distinct products per firm (Iacovone and Javorcik, 2008; Bernard et al., 2009;
Arkolakis and Muendler, 2010; Bernard et al., 2010; Goldberg et al., 2010; Bernard et al., 2011). In the literature
on sectoral and export diversification two alternative measures are commonly employed: the Herfindahl index as
absolute (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003; Klinger and Lederman, 2004; Koren and Tenreyro, 2007; Cadot et al., 2011) and
the Product-Gini as relative measure of diversification (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003; Cadot et al., 2011). For a detailed
discussion on the different indices the interested reader is referred to Cadot et al. (2013). I do not derive a product-
level Theil index. Both the Gini-coefficient and the Theil index are scale independent measures of inequality (see e.g.
Allison, 1978; Bourguignon, 1979; Thon, 1982). As the Pareto distribution used in this model is scale invariant, both
the Gini and Theil index only depend on the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution and lead to similar results.
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a firm, diversification is increasing in firm productivity. Formal firms are more diversified than
informal firms as found in CIEM (2012) and product diversification is independent of the product-
level regulation. However, the Product-Gini, which considers the product-level revenue distribution
of a firm, predicts the opposite. Due to the product-level regulation, registered, and hence formal,
firms produce their highest-revenue products in compliance with regulation, while all other products
are produced in evasion thereof. Therefore, the majority of firm revenue is concentrated among
registered products and formal firms are less diversified than informal firms which do not register
any product. Lastly, the product-level Herfindahl index captures both the number of products
and the skewed revenue distribution. Accordingly, diversification is increasing in productivity, but
controlling for productivity formal firms are less diversified than informal firms. The pattern of
diversification along the firm productivity spectrum is particularly interesting in light of the recent
work on sectoral and export diversification that also finds a pattern of diversification, albeit along
the economic development path (e.g. Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003; Koren and Tenreyro, 2007; Cadot
et al., 2011). Moreover, this result shows the importance of considering product diversification not
just in terms of number of distinct products, but also through product revenue-based measures,
which can lead to different results.
This paper makes therefore four important contributions. First, this is the first model to exam-
ine the drivers of informality in a multi-product setting. Second, the model is the first to consider
specifically product-level regulation and its impact on informality as well as product diversification
in the light of the recent empirical evidence. Third, the model captures informality within the
formal sector, that is evasion of product registration by registered firms, that has been empirically
observed, yet theoretically neglected in the previous literature. Fourth, in addition to measuring
product diversification simply by product scope, the model proposes the use of two revenue-based
measures, the Gini coefficient and Herfindahl index that commonly have been employed in empirical
studies at the industry-level, at the firm-level. As this paper shows, the two indicators can readily
be implemented in this type of multi-product firm model, facilitate bringing theoretical models to
the data and provide for richer predictions. Therefore, this parsimonious setup is the first model
to jointly consider firm heterogeneity, multiple products and informality in one framework and
provides empirically testable predictions that shed light on the sector and diversification choices of
firms in the presence of both product- and firm-level regulation.
Through these contributions, the paper has clear policy implications. First, while the complexity
of firm-level regulations have taken the primary focus in the discourse on curbing informality (see
e.g. World Bank (2013)), the results of this paper show that product-level regulations should also
be part of the discussion. Moreover, as formal firms are predicted to be less diversified than informal
firms, the often targeted formalization of economies could entail a loss in aggregate product variety
and hence welfare. Therefore, the implications of informality and diversification for aggregate
welfare deserve further scrutiny in future work.
I proceed with a description of the model in section 2, and section 3 concludes the paper.
3
2 The model
Consider an economy with an aggregate consumer that supplies L units of labor (section 2.1). A
continuum of firms, heterogeneous in productivity, produce a range of goods and decide to comply
with or evade regulations at the firm- and product-level (section 2.2).
2.1 Demand: The aggregate consumer
The aggregate consumer has a utility function described by the following CES-preferences over a
continuum of identical products a in the interval [0, 1]:
U =
[∫ 1
0
Cιada
] 1
ι
, 0 < ι < 1, (1)
where κ ≡ 11−ι is the elasticity of substitution between products. The consumer derives utility
from the consumption of differentiated varieties of each of the products. Therefore, the consumption
of product a consists of a consumption index Ca of individual varieties v. The consumption index
Ca is described by
Ca =
[∫
v∈V
qa(v)
ρdv
] 1
ρ
, 0 < ρ < 1, (2)
where qa(v) is the consumption of variety v of product a and ρ ≡
σ−1
σ
. σ is the elasticity of
substitution between product varieties. I assume σ > κ, that is a higher substitutability between
product varieties than between products themselves. The price index for each product a depends
on the prices of the individual varieties pa(v) and follows as
Pa =
[∫
v∈V
pa(v)
1−σdv
] 1
1−σ
. (3)
The wage rate w serves as the numeraire. Given the focus on firm informality, labor market
impacts of regulation and informality lie outside of the scope of this paper and therefore are not
explicitly considered.6 The aggregate consumer maximizes utility subject to the constraint that
the aggregate expenditure Ra over the continuum of products is equal to aggregate labor income
described by L with w normalized to 1:
L =
∫ 1
0
CaPada =
∫ 1
0
Rada. (4)
As common in a monopolistic competition setup, the utility-maximizing qa(v), i.e. the demand
for variety v of product a, depends on the aggregate expenditure for the product Ra, the product’s
price index Pa, the price of the variety pa(v) and the elasticity of substitution σ:
6The interested reader is referred to the model in Becker (2014) that jointly considers heterogeneous firms,
informality and labor markets.
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qa(v) = RaP
σ−1
a pa(v)
−σ. (5)
2.2 Supply: Formal and informal firms
In a manner well known from Melitz (2003), firms are initially identical. Upon entering the market,
however, firms do not just draw a firm-specific productivity ϕ, but also a product-specific skill βa
for each product of the continuum of products. This allows each firm to produce a unique variety
v of each of the products. However, firms with the same firm productivity ϕ behave in the same
manner and are accordingly henceforth only indexed by it. A firm’s marginal cost of producing a
product is decreasing in both its firm-specific productivity ϕ and the product-specific skill βa. Firm
output qa(ϕ, βa) of good a is linear in labor input la for the product, that is qa(ϕ, βa) = ϕβala.
Firms decide on their compliance with regulations, and hence their formality, on two levels.7
First, firms are legally required to register, which incurs firm-level fixed cost Ff . Alternatively, firms
can choose to evade registration by only paying Fi and become informal at the firm-level. I assume
Fi < Ff to capture the findings of the empirical literature that firm registration, particularly in
the developing country context, is an arduous procedure and costly (Schneider and Enste, 2000;
Djankov et al., 2002; Auriol and Warlters, 2005; Antunes and de V. Cavalcanti, 2007). Henceforth,
all informal sector variables feature subscript i and formal sector variables subscript f .
Second, firms are legally required to register each of their products at product-level fixed cost ff .
As a benefit of compliance with product-level regulation, and hence formality at the product-level,
firms experience a productivity bonus λ ∈ [0, 1) for the registered product and firm productivity for
the product becomes ϕ1−λ . The productivity bonus can be seen as the result of protection by the
rule of law for that product (de Soto, 1989; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Dabla-Norris et al., 2008).
Alternatively, firms can evade product-level regulation by paying fi. In the context of Ghana’s
TMPs, “[the firms] who did not register any of their products gave reasons such as the cumbersome
nature of the registration procedures and the fees charged being too high.” (Essegbey et al. (2014,
p. 2)) To capture this observation, I assume fi < ff . However, evading product-level registration
entails the probability of government enforcement δ ∈ (0, 1) and loss of product revenue upon
detection of that specific product,8 a reflection of the institutional quality of the economy (Loayza,
1996; Dabla-Norris et al., 2008). All firm- and product-level fixed costs are measured in labor units.
Formal and informal firms maximize their profit by charging a constant markup (1/ρ) over the
product-specific marginal cost for each of their products. Considering the aforementioned costs and
benefits, the prices for products produced in evasion of and in compliance with product regulation
are described by:9
7Appendix E develops an extension with export regulations and provides for additional interesting results.
8Intuitively, if a government agent discovers an unregistered product on the market, the specific product and the
associated revenue will be confiscated.
9The following product-level prices and revenues are the same for formal and informal firms and only differ
between registered and unregistered products.
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pai(ϕ, βa) = ((1− δ)
σρϕβa)
−1 and paf (ϕ, βa) =
(
ρ
ϕ
1− λ
βa
)−1
. (6)
Given consumer demand for the products of each firm described by (5), the revenue for product
a produced in evasion of or compliance with product regulation by a firm with productivity ϕ and
product skill βa is
rai(ϕ, βa) = (1− δ)
σRa (ρPaϕβa)
σ−1 and raf (ϕ, βa) = Ra
(
ρPa
ϕ
1− λ
βa
)σ−1
. (7)
Lastly, taking the product-level fixed costs of into account, the product-level profits for product a
differ according to firm productivity ϕ, product-specific skill βa and whether a product is registered
or not. They are described by
piai(ϕ, βa) = (1− δ)
σRa
σ
(ρPaϕβa)
σ−1 − fi and piaf (ϕ, βa) =
Ra
σ
(
ρPa
ϕ
1− λ
βa
)σ−1
− ff . (8)
The firm-specific productivity ϕ is assumed to be distributed Pareto with G(ϕ) = 1 − ϕ−α
and g(ϕ) = αϕ−α−1, due to the fit of the Pareto distribution to the empirically observed firm
productivity distribution (Axtell, 2001; Helpman et al., 2004). Additionally, I follow Bernard et al.
(2011) in assuming that the product-specific skill is also distributed Pareto with Z(β) = 1 − β−k
and z(β) = kβ−k−1. The lower bound of both distributions is normalized to 1. Lastly, I assume
α > k > σ − 1 to ensure a finite mean firm size.
I proceed by solving the model in two steps. First, I solve the firms’ choice of products, taking
their decision on joining the formal or informal sector as given (section 2.2.1). Second, I solve
for the firms’ choice of sector given their firm productivity ϕ (section 2.2.2). Lastly, I examine
the impact of product-regulation on diversification as measured by product scope (section 2.2.3),
Product-Gini (section 2.2.4) and Herfindahl index (section 2.2.5), and conclude by comparing the
three indicators (sections 2.2.6).
2.2.1 Firms’ product choice
In the model, corresponding to the Ghanaian TMP sector where some registered firms evade
product-level regulation (Essegbey et al., 2014), registered firms may evade regulation for their
products, and hence produce them informally. Unregistered, and hence informal, firms evade reg-
ulations for all their products. With the same production technology and demand structure for
all identical products, the pricing of a product and accordingly the product-level profit depends
solely on firm productivity ϕ, product-specific skill β and whether a product is registered or not.
Accordingly, I henceforth omit the product-specific subscript a.
For informal firms there exists a product skill threshold level β∗i (ϕ) at which a firm with pro-
ductivity ϕ just breaks even in producing an unregistered product. The reason for this is the
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product-level fixed cost fi that limits the profitability of an unregistered product pii(ϕ, β) described
in (8). β∗i (ϕ) is defined by
pii(ϕ, β
∗
i (ϕ)) = 0. (9)
Any product for which the firm draws a higher product skill than β∗i (ϕ) can be profitably
produced by the firm. Any product with a lower product skill is unprofitable and hence will not be
produced. Notably, β∗i (ϕ) depends on the firm-specific productivity ϕ. A high firm productivity
compensates for a low product-specific skill and accordingly high-productivity firms are able to
produce even low product skill products profitably, that is β∗i (ϕ) is decreasing in ϕ.
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Formal firms, on the other hand, may produce goods in compliance with or evasion of product-
level regulations. Intuitively, as product registration at ff is more costly than informal production
at fi, firms only register products if the registration provides them for a higher profitability than
informal production. Accordingly, products in which a firm draws a low product-specific skill will
not be registered and high skill products will be registered. Therefore, the lower product-skill
threshold β∗i (ϕ) is defined as for informal firms by (9). In addition, there exists a threshold level
β∗f (ϕ) that determines the minimum product skill threshold for registered products defined by
pii(ϕ, β
∗
f (ϕ)) = pif (ϕ, β
∗
f (ϕ)) (10)
above which registration of a product is more profitable than unregistered production. In
sum, if a formal firm draws a product-specific skill above β∗f (ϕ), it will produce the product in
compliance with the product regulation. A skill draw below β∗f (ϕ), but above β
∗
i (ϕ) leads to the
evasion of product regulation for that product, and a draw below β∗i (ϕ) means that the firm will
not produce the product since the production would incur negative profits. The sorting β∗i (ϕ) <
β∗f (ϕ) is ensured if
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ <
ff
fi
, which I henceforth assume holds.11 The condition follows
economic intuition. Only if the benefit of formal production relative to the potential government
enforcement of informality is smaller than the cost of registering a good relative to producing an
unregistered good, a higher product skill is required to benefit from registration of a good compared
to unregistered production.12
10Mathematically
∂β∗i (ϕ)
∂ϕ
= −
[
fiσ
(1−δ)σR
] 1
σ−1
(ρP )−1 ϕ−2 < 0.
11The condition follows from the assumption that, given the same firm productivity, producing goods in evasion of
product regulation is profitable at a lower product skill level than producing goods in compliance of that regulation.
This requires that β∗i < β
∗
f for β
∗
i from pii(β
∗
i , ϕ) = 0 & β
∗
f from pif (β
∗
f , ϕ) = 0. β
∗
i =
[
fiσ
(1−δ)σR
] 1
σ−1
(ρPϕ)−1 and
β∗f =
[
Ffσ
R
] 1
σ−1
(
ρP ϕ
1−λ
)−1
. Hence, (1−λ)
1−σ
(1−δ)σ
<
ff
fi
. As both pii(ϕ, β) and pif (ϕ, β) are monotonically increasing in
β, single-crossing of the two functions is ensured and β∗i (ϕ) < β
∗
f (ϕ) holds.
12In this model, firms produce goods of the same quality at different prices. It is conceivable that unregistered, and
hence informal products, are of lower quality. An alternative interpretation of Melitz (2003)-type models is that firms
produce products of different quality at the same cost. Given the alternative interpretation, this model implicitly
captures a quality and hence demand difference between registered and unregistered products. Heterogeneous firms
and heterogeneous product quality are explicitly modeled in Verhoogen (2008), albeit in a setup of heterogeneous
workers.
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Since the product skill draws of firms over the continuum of identical products are i.i.d. and
given the law of large numbers, the expected profit of a firm over the continuum of products is
equal to the expected profit for an individual product, which equals the probability of drawing a
product-specific skill above the threshold levels. Accordingly, total firm profit of an informal firm
that does not comply with firm-level regulation depends on firm productivity ϕ and is described
by
pii(ϕ) =
∫ ∞
β∗i (ϕ)
[
(1− δ)σ
R
σ
(ρPϕβ)σ−1 − fi
]
z(β)dβ − Fi. (11)
Formal firms, on the other hand, can produce products both in evasion of and/or compliance
with product-level regulation, and pay a firm-level registration fee Ff :
pif (ϕ) =
∫ β∗f (ϕ)
β∗i (ϕ)
[
(1− δ)σ
R
σ
(ρPϕβ)σ−1 − fi
]
z(β)dβ
+
∫ ∞
β∗
f
(ϕ)
[
R
σ
(
ρP
ϕ
1− λ
β
)σ−1
− ff
]
z(β)dβ − Ff . (12)
The share of registered products that a formal firm produces is equal to the probability of
drawing a product skill above the threshold β∗f (ϕ), i.e. 1 − Z(β
∗
f (ϕ)) = β
∗
f (ϕ)
−k. The share of
unregistered products is described by the probability of drawing a product-specific skill above the
informal product-skill threshold β∗i (ϕ), but below the formal threshold β
∗
f (ϕ), i.e. Z(β
∗
f (ϕ)) −
Z(β∗i (ϕ)) = β
∗
i (ϕ)
−k − β∗f (ϕ)
−k. Using (9) and (10), I can write the share of unregistered products
relative to the share of registered products as
β∗i (ϕ)
−k − β∗f (ϕ)
−k
β∗f (ϕ)
−k
=
[
fi
ff − fi
] −k
σ−1
[
(1− λ)1−σ
(1− δ)σ
− 1
] −k
σ−1
− 1. (13)
The right hand side of (13) is independent of ϕ. Therefore, while the share of the whole
continuum of products that is produced by a firm depends on its firm productivity ϕ, the relative
share of unregistered to registered products is the same for all formal firms and independent of
ϕ. A comparative statics exercise on (13) provides for intuitive results. Parameters that increase
the relative profitability of production in compliance with product regulation (decrease in ff or
increase in fi, λ, δ) lead to a higher relative share of registered products.
Proposition 1. The share of unregistered relative to registered products of a formal firm is in-
creasing in ff and decreasing in fi, λ and δ.
Proof. See appendix A.
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2.2.2 Firms’ sector choice
Having solved the product choice of firms, as second step I solve firms’ sector choice. Given their
firm-level productivity ϕ, firms choose to either register their firm and become formal, evade firm-
level registration and become informal or not produce at all according to the profitability of the
activity (e.g. de Mel et al., 2013; La Porta and Shleifer, 2014), that is max {pii(ϕ), pif (ϕ), 0}. This
poses the question how informal and formal firms are distributed over the productivity spectrum.
The empirical literature provides an answer to this question: informal firms are lower-productivity
firms and formal firms are higher-productivity firms (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; de Paula and
Scheinkman, 2011). Analogously to the product skill threshold levels, the firm-level fixed costs lead
to the firm-level productivity threshold levels ϕ∗i and ϕ
∗
f , which are the productivity levels above
which firms select into informal and formal production, respectively. The thresholds are determined
with the help of (11) and (12) by
pii(ϕ
∗
i ) = 0 (14)
and
pii(ϕ
∗
f ) = pif (ϕ
∗
f ). (15)
If a firm draws a firm-level productivity below ϕ∗i , it will not produce at all. For a draw above
ϕ∗i , but below ϕ
∗
f , the firm becomes informal, and for a draw above ϕ
∗
f the firm becomes formal.
The sorting ϕ∗i < ϕ
∗
f is ensured if 1 <
[
(1−λ)1−σ−(1−δ)σ
(1−δ)σ
] k
σ−1
<
Ff
Fi
[
ff−fi
fi
] k+1−σ
σ−1
, which I henceforth
assume holds.13 Intuitively, this condition compares the benefit of formality relative to informality
to the costs of formality relative to informality. There are two parts to the comparison. First,
the benefit of formality relative to informality
[
(1−λ)1−σ−(1−δ)σ
(1−δ)σ
] k
σ−1
has to be greater than 1 for
formality to be attractive for any firm. Second, if the formality relative to informality costs ratio
Ff
Fi
[
ff−fi
fi
] k+1−σ
σ−1
is greater than the benefit ratio, then only high-productivity firms will find it
beneficial to become formal.
Similar to the share of registered and unregistered products, due to an i.i.d. firm productivity
13The condition results from two assumptions. First, I assume that informal sector firms break even at a lower
productivity level than formal firms, which requires that ϕ∗i < ϕ
∗
f for ϕ
∗
i from pii(ϕ
∗
i ) = 0 & ϕ
∗
f from pif (ϕ
∗
f ) = 0.
ϕ∗i = F
1
k
i
[
R(1−δ)σ
σ
] 1
σ−1
(ρP )−1 f
k+1−σ
(σ−1)k
i
[
σ−1
k+1−σ
]−1
k
and
ϕ∗f = F
1
k
f
[
R(1−δ)σ
σ
] 1
σ−1
(ρP )−1 f
k+1−σ
(σ−1)k
i
[
σ−1
k+1−σ
]−1
k
[
fi
ff−fi
] k+1−σ
(1−σ)k
[
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ
− 1
] k
σ−1
. Hence,
[
(1−λ)1−σ−(1−δ)σ
(1−δ)σ
] k
σ−1
<
Ff
Fi
[
fi
ff−fi
]σ−1−k
σ−1
. Second, I assume that the marginal profitability with respect to pro-
ductivity is higher in the formal sector, which requires ∂pii
∂ϕ
<
∂pif
∂ϕ
. ∂pii
∂ϕ
= kϕk−1
[
R(1−δ)σ
σ
] −k
1−σ
(ρP ) f
σ−1−k
σ−1
i
[
σ−1
k+1−σ
]
and
∂pif
∂ϕ
= kϕk−1
[
R(1−δ)σ
σ
] −k
1−σ
(ρP ) f
σ−1−k
σ−1
i
[
σ−1
k+1−σ
] [
fi
ff−fi
] k+1−σ
σ−1
[
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ
− 1
] k
σ−1
.
Hence, 1 <
[
(1−λ)1−σ−(1−δ)σ
(1−δ)σ
] k
σ−1
. The two conditions jointly are 1 <
[
(1−λ)1−σ−(1−δ)σ
(1−δ)σ
] k
σ−1
<
Ff
Fi
[
fi
ff−fi
]σ−1−k
σ−1
.
As both pii(ϕ) and pif (ϕ) are monotonically increasing in ϕ, single-crossing of the two functions is ensured and
ϕ∗i < ϕ
∗
f holds.
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distribution and the law of large numbers, the share of formal firms is equal to the probability of a
productivity draw above the formality threshold ϕ∗f , i.e. 1−G(ϕ
∗
f ) = ϕ
∗−α
f , and the share of informal
firms equals the probability of drawing a productivity between ϕ∗i and ϕ
∗
f , i.e. Z(ϕ
∗
f ) − Z(ϕ
∗
i ) =
ϕ∗−αi − ϕ
∗−α
f . Using (14) and (15) that determine the productivity cutoff levels, I derive the share
of informal firms relative to formal firms:
ϕ∗−αi − ϕ
∗−α
f
ϕ∗−αf
=
[
Fi
Ff − Fi
]−α
k
[
fi
ff − fi
]−α(k+1−σ)
(σ−1)k
[
(1− λ)1−σ
(1− δ)σ
− 1
] −α
σ−1
− 1. (16)
Intuitively, factors that make formal sector participation relatively more costly or decrease its
benefits (increase in Ff , ff , decrease in Fi, fi, λ, δ) lead to a relatively larger informal sector.
Importantly, when considering both types of regulation, not just firm-level, but also product-level
regulation ff steers informal sector participation.
14 This provides the rational for the findings
of Loayza et al. (2005), who show product market regulations to be drivers of informality in a
cross-country context.
Proposition 2. The share of informal relative to formal firms is increasing in Ff , ff and decreasing
in Fi, fi, λ and δ.
Proof. See appendix B.
Figure 1: Sorting of firms and products along the productivity and product skill dimensions.
14This is particularly striking in contrast to a setup with only firm-level regulations in place as derived in appendix
F or in Becker (2014).
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The results of Propositions 1 and 2 can be graphically illustrated to highlight the effect of prod-
uct regulation on both the share of informal firms and unregistered products in the market. Figure
1 pictures all products of an economy within the firm productivity and product skill dimensions.
The curves β∗i (ϕ) and β
∗
f (ϕ) are the product skill threshold levels following from (9) and (10):
β∗i (ϕ) =
[
fiσ
(1− δ)σR
] 1
σ−1
(ρPϕ)−1 (17)
and
β∗f (ϕ) =
[
(ff − fi)σ
R
] 1
σ−1
(ρPϕ)−1
[
(1− λ)1−σ − (1− δ)σ
] 1
1−σ . (18)
As higher productivity firms are able to produce products at a lower product-specific skill,
the product skill thresholds β∗i (ϕ) and β
∗
f (ϕ) are decreasing in firm productivity.
15 The firm
productivity thresholds ϕ∗i and ϕ
∗
f , however, are independent of product skill. They follow from
the combination of their definitions (14) and (15) with the product skill cutoff thresholds (17) and
(18):
ϕ∗i = F
1
k
i
[
k + 1− σ
σ − 1
] 1
k
f
σ−k−1
(1−σ)k
i
[
R(1− δ)σ
σ
] 1
1−σ
(ρP )−1 (19)
and
ϕ∗f = [Ff − Fi]
1
k
[
k + 1− σ
σ − 1
] 1
k
[ff − fi]
σ−k−1
(1−σ)k
[
R(1− δ)σ
σ
] 1
1−σ
(ρP )−1
[
(1− λ)1−σ
(1− δ)σ
− 1
] 1
σ−1
. (20)
Firms with firm productivity above ϕ∗i and below ϕ
∗
f evade firm registration. Firms with
productivity level above ϕ∗f register their firm, thus being formal firms. Similarly, products for which
a formal firm draws a product skill above β∗i (ϕ) but below β
∗
f (ϕ) are produced in evasion of product
regulation, and products with product skill above β∗f (ϕ) are registered products. Unregistered
products accordingly take up space ABCDG. However, the effect of a change in firm-level regulation
Ff differs to that of a change in product-level regulation ff . More costly firm-level regulation,
i.e. an increase in Ff , ceteris paribus affects firms’ decision to register their business and shifts
the productivity threshold level from ϕ∗f to ϕ
′
f (
∂ϕ∗f
∂Ff
> 0 from (20)). Yet, the decision on the
compliance with product regulation is not affected. When deciding on product registration, the
firm level regulation cost Ff is already sunk and firms optimize only at the product-level, which
mathematically means that (18) does not depend on Ff .
16 The result is an increase in the share
of informal firms, and accordingly unregistered products. Unregistered products take up space
ABCDEGH and informalization at the product-level has increased. In contrast to this, an increase
in product-level regulation cost ff makes not just product registration more costly and thus shifts
15Mathematically,
∂β∗i (ϕ)
∂ϕ
= −
[
fiσ
(1−δ)σR
] 1
σ−1
(ρP )−1 ϕ−2 < 0 and
∂β∗f (ϕ)
∂ϕ
= −
[
(ff−fi)σ
R
] 1
σ−1 [
(1− λ)1−σ − (1− δ)σ
] 1
1−σ (ρP )−1 ϕ−2 < 0.
16β∗i (ϕ) and ϕ
∗
i do not depend on Ff and are unaffected.
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the product registration threshold from β∗f (ϕ) to β
′
f (ϕ) (
∂β∗i (ϕ)
∂ff
> 0 from (17)), but also makes
formal sector participation less attractive (
∂ϕ∗i
∂ff
> 0 from (19)) and shifts the productivity threshold
from ϕ∗f to ϕ
′
f .
17 As a result, both the share of informal firms and unregistered products in the
economy rise to take up space ABCDEFGH, while the number of registered products decreases
to only take up space I. By having an effect on both the share of informal firms and unregistered
products, product-level regulation has a stronger effect than firm-level regulation on the extent of
informality at the product-level.
2.2.3 Product Scope
A firm’s product scope K(ϕ) is defined as the number of distinct products a firm produces. Because
product skill draws are i.i.d. over the continuum of products, K(ϕ) is equal to the probability of
drawing a product skill above the product skill threshold β∗i (ϕ), i.e. 1− Z(β
∗
i (ϕ)). Both informal
and formal firms do not register their lowest product skill goods and the relevant product skill
threshold is in both cases β∗i (ϕ). Hence, the product-level regulation does not affect the product
scope of firms. The product scope of both type of firms are
Ki(ϕ) = 1− Z(β
∗
i (ϕ)) = β
∗
i (ϕ)
−k and Kf (ϕ) = 1− Z(β
∗
i (ϕ)) = β
∗
i (ϕ)
−k. (21)
As the threshold is decreasing in firm productivity, product scope is increasing in firm produc-
tivity.18 Therefore, higher productivity firms are more diversified measured by the product scope,
which corresponds to the theoretical and empirical findings of Bernard et al. (2010) and Bernard
et al. (2011).
Proposition 3. Product scope is increasing in firm productivity.
2.2.4 Product-Gini
Originally a measure of inequality, the Gini coefficient is commonly employed as a measure of
diversification at the industry-level, for instance in the context of sectoral and export diversification
(e.g. Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003; Cadot et al., 2011). I employ the Gini coefficient at the product-
level to examine the product revenue distribution and hence the product diversification of a firm.
The derivation of the Product-Gini for informal firms requires two steps. First, I derive γ, i.e. the
share of products that are produced with a product skill below β¯ of the total number of products
a firm produces:
γ =
∫ β¯
β∗i (ϕ)
βz(β)dβ∫∞
β∗i (ϕ)
βz(β)dβ
= 1−
(
β¯
β∗i (ϕ)
)−k
. (22)
17β∗i (ϕ) and ϕ
∗
i do not depend on ff and are unaffected.
18Substituting for β∗i (ϕ) leads to Ki(ϕ) =
[
fiσ
(1−δ)σR
] k
1−σ
(ρPϕ)k and accordingly ∂Ki(ϕ)
∂ϕ
> 0.
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Next, I derive the share of product revenue of products with product skill below β¯ relative to
total firm revenue Qi as
Qi =
∫ β¯
β∗i (ϕ)
ri(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ∫∞
β∗i (ϕ)
ri(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ
= 1−
(
β¯
β∗i (ϕ)
)σ−k−1
. (23)
Lastly, substituting (22) into (23) leads to the Lorenz curve Qi(γ):
Qi(γ) = 1− [1− γ]
σ−k−1
−k , (24)
which has the desired properties Qi(0) = 0, Qi(1) = 1 and
∂Qi(γ)
∂γ
> 0. The Product-Gini of
informal firms Gi derives from
Gi = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
Qi(γ)dγ =
σ − 1
2k + 1− σ
. (25)
Given its relative nature, Gi is independent of firm productivity ϕ, and hence the total number
of products a firm produces. The product-level Gini only captures the distribution of the product
revenues relative to the whole firm revenue. Firms that are neither registered on a firm- nor on a
product-level are subject to government enforcement δ for all products and thus enforcement does
not affect the relative distribution. Further, the distribution of product revenue follows the product
skill distribution and accordingly Gi only depends on the product skill distribution parameter k
and the elasticity of substitution between the products of different firms σ.19
The derivation of the Product-Gini of formal firms Gf is more complicated as formal firms
register only some of their products. The individual steps necessary to derive Gf can be found in
appendix C.
Gf = Gi
{
2
Ω(σ − 1)
[
2k + 1− σ
2
[
Ω− 2φk
[
(1− δ)σ−1 +Ω
]]
−φ1+2k−σk
[
(1− λ)1−σ − (1− δ)σ−1
]
− (1− δ)σ−1(σ − 1− k)
]}
, (26)
where φ ≡ (β∗i (ϕ)/β
∗
f (ϕ)) and Ω ≡
[
(1− δ)σ + φk+1−σ
[
(1− λ)1−σ − (1− δ)σ
]]
. Besides the
Pareto distribution parameter k and the elasticity of substitution between products σ, Gf depends
on φ and Ω that are proxies for the relative share of unregistered to registered products produced
by a formal firm. Firms that are formal at the firm-level do not register a share of their goods
under the probability of government enforcement δ and produce their registered products with the
productivity bonus λ. Given this, unregistered products generate a relatively lower revenue per
19Informal firms only differ in their threshold product skill level β∗i (ϕ) and hence the lower bound of their product
revenue distribution. A truncated Pareto is still Pareto, albeit with a lower minimum bound and mean described by
β∗i (ϕ) [k/(k − 1)]. As the Gini-coefficient is scale independent (see e.g. Allison, 1978; Thon, 1982), only the Pareto
distribution parameter matters and all firms that are informal at the firm-level are characterized by the same product-
level Gini. Notably, the same Gi would also hold if there were no product-level regulations in place and a firm would
produce all products. See appendix F.2 for a derivation of this result.
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product and registered products generate a relatively higher revenue. Thus, the Lorenz curve has
two segments.
In a model where firms register all their products, as for instance in Bernard et al. (2010), firms’
product diversification would be described by Gi(ϕ). However, as formal firms may comply with
or evade product regulation, their Lorenz curve is kinked and product diversification is described
by Gf (ϕ). The product-level regulation ff has two effects. First, it influences firms’ choice of
firm-level informality or formality, and thus whether diversification of the firm is measured by Gi
or Gf . Second, ff enters φ, determines the relative share of unregistered products and hence the
absolute value of Gf .
Proposition 4. The Product-Gini is independent of firm productivity conditional on a firms’ sector
choice.
2.2.5 Herfindahl Index
The Herfindahl index is an absolute measure of diversification that captures both the distribution of
a firm’s revenue among its products and the number of distinct products. To measure the product
diversification of a firm I derive it in two steps. For informal firms I first derive the revenue share
si(β) of an unregistered product that is produced with product skill β of total firm revenue:
si(β) =
ri(ϕ, β)∫∞
β∗i (ϕ)
ri(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ
=
k + 1− σ
k
β∗i (ϕ)
1+k−σβσ−1. (27)
Second, the product-level Herfindahl index for informal firms Hi(ϕ) is computed as the integral
over the squared revenue shares for all produced products:
Hi(ϕ) =
∫ ∞
β∗i (ϕ)
si(β)
2z(β)dβ = Hβ∗i (ϕ)
k, (28)
whereH = (k+1−σ)2/ [k(k + 2− 2σ)] > 1.20 Similar to the Product-Gini, the Herfindahl index
depends on the product skill distribution parameter k and the elasticity of substitution between
products σ, both captured by H.21 Further, the product-level Herfindahl index, similar to the
product scope, depends on firm productivity ϕ. Higher productivity firms are characterized by a
lower β∗i (ϕ) and produce more distinct product. Hence, firm revenue is distributed over a wider
range of products and the Herfindahl index indicates these firms as more diversified.22
The product-level Herfindahl index of formal firms Hf (ϕ) consists of two pieces. First, the
product revenue share of unregistered products and second the product revenue share of registered
20Rewriting H > 1 leads to (σ2 − 1)(σ − 1) > 0, which holds because σ > 1.
21Without any product-level regulations in place, β∗i (ϕ) = 1 and the product-level Herfindahl reduces to H. This
result is derived in appendix F.3.
22Substituting for β∗i (ϕ) leads to Hi(ϕ) = H
[
fiσ
(1−δ)σR
] k
σ−2
(ρPϕ)−k and accordingly ∂Hi(ϕ)
∂ϕ
< 0.
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products. The derivation is more arduous than for informal firms and the interested reader is
therefore referred to appendix D.
Hf (ϕ) = Hβ
∗
i (ϕ)
kΩ−2ω, (29)
where ω ≡
[
(1− δ)2σ + φk+2−2σ
[
(1− λ)2−2σ − (1− δ)2σ
]]
and Ω−2ω > 1.23 Notably, Hf (ϕ) con-
sists of three parts. First, H reflects the product revenue distribution as a result of the product
skill distribution within a firm and the elasticity of substitution between product varieties. Second,
β∗i (ϕ)
k captures the increasing number of products a higher productivity firm can produce due to
a lower product skill threshold.24 A larger number of products reduces the Herfindahl index.25
Lastly, Ω−2ω reflects the skew of the revenue distribution, because the share of registered products
generates relatively higher product revenue than the share of unregistered products. The less even
distribution of revenue among all products entails less diversification and increases the Herfindahl
index.
Because there exists informality at the product-level, some firms diversification is described
by Gf (ϕ). Without the possibility of the evasion of product-level regulation, as for instance in
Bernard et al. (2010), diversification of all firms would be described by Hi(ϕ). Therefore, similar
to the Product-Gini, also the Herfindahl index is affected by the product-level regulation ff in two
ways. First, the product-level regulation affects firms’ choice of sector and accordingly whether
diversification of the firm is measured by Hi(ϕ) or Hf (ϕ). Second, ff enters Ω
−2ω, which captures
the extent to which the revenue distribution is skewed through informal and formal production of
goods, and thus the absolute value of Hf (ϕ).
Proposition 5. The product-level Herfindahl index is decreasing in firm productivity conditional
on a firms’ sector choice.
2.2.6 Comparison of the indicators
The diversification of an informal and a formal firm, measured by the relative product scope,
Ki(ϕi)/Kf (ϕf ), can be compared using (21):
Ki(ϕi)
Kf (ϕf )
=
(
ϕi
ϕf
)k
< 1. (30)
The difference in product scope only depends on the relative productivity difference between
the two firms. Because informal sector firms are characterized by a lower productivity than formal
sector firms (cf. (16)), they produce a smaller number of distinct products and are less diversified
as measured by product scope. This corresponds to the empirical finding in CIEM (2012).
23Ω−2ω > 1 holds if Ω2 − ω < 0. Rewriting leads to
φ1−σ
[
(1− λ)1−σ − (1− δ)σ
] [
φk − 1
]
+ 2(1 − δ)σ
[
1− φ1−σ
]
< 0, which holds because φ ∈ (0, 1), 1 − σ < 0 and
(1− λ)1−σ > (1− δ)σ.
24Mathematically
∂β∗i (ϕ)
∂ϕ
< 0.
25Substituting for β∗i (ϕ) leads to Hf (ϕ) = H
[
fiσ
(1−δ)σR
] k
σ−2
(ρPϕ)−kΩ−2ω and accordingly
∂Hf (ϕ)
∂ϕ
< 0.
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Contrary to that, (25) and (26) in combination show that unregistered firms are more diversified
than registered firms measured by the Product-Gini:
Gi
Gf
=
[
2
Ω(σ − 1)
]−1 [2k + 1− σ
2
[
Ω− 2(1− δ)σ
[
1− φk
]
− 2φkΩ
]
+kφ2k+1−σ
[
(1− λ)1−σ − (1− δ)σ
]
+ k(1− δ)σ
]−1
< 1. (31)
The product-level Gini captures the concentration of revenue of formal firms among registered
products through φ ∈ (0, 1). Informal firms produce only unregistered products. Therefore, formal
firms are less diversified than informal firms and Gi/Gf < 1.
26 Notably, this result is independent
of firm productivity and holds when comparing any informal to any formal firm. Despite that the
product-level regulation ff affects the absolute value of Gf through φ, Gf > Gi holds in any case.
Lastly, using (28) and (29) leads to the relative difference in diversification of firms in both
sectors measured by the Herfindahl index, Hi(ϕi)/Hf (ϕf ), which depends on firms’ productivity
difference, formality status and economic parameters:
Hi(ϕi)
Hf (ϕf )
= Ω2ω−1
(
ϕf
ϕi
)k
. (32)
The difference in product diversification between informal and formal firms is driven by two
components. First, higher-productivity firms are able to produce a wider range of distinct prod-
ucts given product-level regulation and hence the relative difference in diversification of two firms
depends on their relative productivities. Second, formal firms produce both registered and unreg-
istered products. As most of formal firms’ profit is generated by registered goods, the product
revenue distribution of formal firms is skewed. This is captured by Ω2ω−1 < 1 that decreases
Hi(ϕi)/Hf (ϕf ) and indicates that, controlling for firm productivity ϕ, formal firms are less diversi-
fied than informal firms. Similar to the case of the Product-Gini, while the product-level regulation
affects Hf (ϕ) through Ω
2ω−1, formal firms are always less diversified than informal firms given the
same firm productivity ϕ.27
Proposition 6. As measured by product scope, formal firms are more diversified than informal
firms. By contrast, formal firms are less diversified than informal firms measured by the Product-
Gini and, when controlling for productivity, by the product-level Herfindahl index.
Figure 2 is a stylized visualization of the three findings summarized in Proposition 6 of product
diversification over the productivity spectrum. Product scope, as measured by the number of
26
[
2
Ω(σ−1)
]−1 [
2k+1−σ
2
[
Ω− 2(1− δ)σ
[
1− φk
]
− 2φkΩ
]
+ kφ2k+1−σ
[
(1− λ)1−σ − (1− δ)σ
]
+ k(1− δ)σ
]−1
< 1
can be rewritten as (k + 1 − σ)
[[
(1− λ)1−σ − (1− δ)σ
] [
φk+1−σ − φ2k+1−σ
]]
> 0. Because (1 − λ)1−σ > (1 − δ)σ,
k + 1− σ > 0 and φ ∈ (0, 1), it must be that Gi/Gf < 1.
27These diversification results are particularly interesting in comparison to the variant of the model developed in
appendix F in which firms do not face a product-level regulation and as a result all firms are equally diversified as
measured by any of the three indicators.
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distinct products, is increasing in firm productivity over the whole spectrum and formal firms are
more diversified than informal firms. Measured by the Product-Gini, formal firms are less diversified
than informal firms. However, the diversification only depends on formality status and not firm
productivity. Lastly, diversification measured by the Herfindahl index combines features of the
two other indicators. On the one hand, diversification is increasing in firm productivity. On the
other hand, there is a diversification gap between informal and formal firms, where formal firms
are indicated as less diversified given their skewed product revenue distribution.
Figure 2: Product diversification along the productivity spectrum measured by the three indicators.
3 Conclusion
In this paper I build a model of heterogeneous multi-product firms in the presence of both product-
and firm-level regulations. I capture a multi-dimensional concept of informality and explain firms’
sector choice and diversification decision in the presence of these two type of regulations. The
results indicate that the product-level regulation is an important driver of informality at both firm-
and product-level. Further, the model highlights that in addition to product scope, also product
revenue-based measures are important to understand diversification. More specifically, the model
shows that utilizing product scope leads to the opposite prediction than using a Product-Gini or
Herfindahl index, that is informal firms are indicated to be less or more diversified than formal
firms.
The present work offers two avenues for fruitful future research. First, considering both product-
17
and firm-level regulations in a general equilibrium setup would provide a richer set of predictions.
Increasing product-level regulation might not only lead to an adjustment of the number of products
by a given a firm, but also have general equilibrium impacts that further affect the demand for
all products. This extension would be particularly interesting with regard to the impacts of trade
on informality in a multi-product setting. If foreign market access is reserved for formal firms
and registered products, resource reallocation is likely. Similarly, extending the model to explicitly
feature labor market frictions along the lines of Becker (2014) would provide interesting insights into
the impact of product-level regulation on employment, particularly in general equilibrium. Resource
reallocation jointly with labor market frictions could potentially lead to greater inequality between
workers employed in heterogeneous firms. Therefore, future research should carefully consider the
far-reaching effects of product-level regulation, which my model shows to be a new and important
driver of informality and determinants of product diversification.
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Appendix
A Share of unregistered relative to registered products
(
β∗i (ϕ)
β∗
f
(ϕ)
)−k
− 1 =
[
fi
ff−fi
] −k
σ−1
[
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ − 1
] −k
σ−1
− 1.
∂
(
β∗i (ϕ)
β∗
f
(ϕ)
)−k
∂fi
=
[
−k
σ−1
] [
ff
(ff−fi)2
] [
fi
ff−fi
] −k
σ−1
−1 [
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ − 1
] −k
σ−1
< 0.
∂
(
β∗i (ϕ)
β∗
f
(ϕ)
)−k
∂ff
=
[
−k
σ−1
] [
−fi
(ff−fi)2
] [
fi
ff−fi
] −k
σ−1
−1 [
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ − 1
] −k
σ−1
> 0.
∂
(
β∗i (ϕ)
β∗
f
(ϕ)
)−k
∂λ
= −k
[
fi
ff−fi
] −k
σ−1
[
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ − 1
] −k
σ−1
−1
(1− λ)−σ(1− δ)−σ < 0.
∂
(
β∗i (ϕ)
β∗
f
(ϕ)
)−k
∂δ
=
[
−kσ
σ−1
] [
fi
ff−fi
] 1
σ−1
[
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ − 1
] 1
σ−1
−1
(1− λ)1−σ(1− δ)−σ−1 < 0.
B Share of informal relative to formal firms
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
)−α
− 1 =
[
Fi
Ff−Fi
]−α
k
[
fi
ff−fi
]−α(k+1−σ)
(σ−1)k
[
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ − 1
] −α
σ−1
− 1.
∂
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
)−α
∂Fi
= −α
k
[
Ff
(Ff−Fi)2
] [
Fi
Ff−Fi
]−α
k
−1 [
fi
ff−fi
]−α(k+1−σ)
(σ−1)k
[
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ − 1
] −α
σ−1
< 0.
∂
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
)−α
∂Ff
= α
k
[
Fi
(Ff−Fi)2
] [
Fi
Ff−Fi
]−α
k
−1 [
fi
ff−fi
]−α(k+1−σ)
(σ−1)k
[
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ − 1
] −α
σ−1
> 0.
∂
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
)−α
∂fi
=
[
−α(k+1−σ)
(σ−1)k
] [
ff
(ff−fi)2
] [
Fi
Ff−Fi
]−α
k
[
fi
ff−fi
]−α(k+1−σ)
(σ−1)k
−1 [
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ − 1
] −α
σ−1
< 0.
∂
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
)−α
∂ff
=
[
−α(k+1−σ)
(σ−1)k
] [
fi
(ff−fi)2
] [
Fi
Ff−Fi
]−α
k
[
fi
ff−fi
]−α(k+1−σ)
(σ−1)k
−1 [
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ − 1
] −α
σ−1
> 0.
∂
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
)−α
∂λ
= −α
[
Fi
Ff−Fi
]−α
k
[
fi
ff−fi
]−α(k+1−σ)
(σ−1)k
[
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ − 1
] −α
σ−1
−1
(1− λ)−σ(1− δ)−σ < 0.
∂
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
)−α
∂δ
=
[
−α
σ−1
] [
Fi
Ff−Fi
]−α
k
[
fi
ff−fi
]−α(k+1−σ)
(σ−1)k
[
(1−λ)1−σ
(1−δ)σ − 1
] −α
σ−1
−1
(1− λ)1−σ(1− δ)−σ−1 < 0.
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C Product-Gini of formal firms
The first segment of the Lorenz curve consists of unregistered products. Therefore, I first derive
the number of products produced with a product skill below β¯:
γ =
∫ β¯
β∗i (ϕ)
βz(β)dβ∫ β∗
f
(ϕ)
β∗i (ϕ)
βz(β)dβ +
∫∞
β∗
f
(ϕ) βz(β)dβ
= 1−
(
β¯
β∗i (ϕ)
)−k
. (33)
The next step is calculating the share in revenue of unregistered products that are produced with
a product skill below β¯:
Q1 =
∫ β¯
β∗i (ϕ)
ri(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ∫ β∗
f
(ϕ)
β∗i (ϕ)
ri(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ +
∫∞
β∗
f
(ϕ) rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ
=
(1− δ)σ−1
Ω
[(
β¯
β∗i (ϕ)
)σ−k−1
− 1
]
, (34)
where φ ≡ (β∗i (ϕ)/β
∗
f (ϕ)) and Ω ≡
[
(1− δ)σ + φk+1−σ
[
(1− λ)1−σ − (1− δ)σ
]]
. Combining (33)
and (34) leads to the first segment of the Lorenz curve Q1(γ):
Q1(γ) =
(1− δ)σ−1
Ω
[
[1− γ]
k+1−σ
k − 1
]
. (35)
The second segment of the Lorenz curve consists of registered products. The number of products
produced with product skill below β¯ are
γ =
∫ β∗f (ϕ)
β∗i (ϕ)
βz(β)dβ +
∫ β¯
β∗
f
(ϕ) βz(β)dβ∫ β∗
f
(ϕ)
β∗i (ϕ)
βz(β)dβ +
∫∞
β∗
f
(ϕ) βz(β)dβ
= 1−
(
β¯
β∗i (ϕ)
)−k
. (36)
Subsequently, I calculate the share in revenue of products produced with product skill below β¯:
Q2 =
∫ β∗f (ϕ)
β∗i (ϕ)
ri(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ +
∫ β¯
β∗
f
(ϕ) rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ∫ β∗
f
(ϕ)
β∗i (ϕ)
ri(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ +
∫∞
β∗
f
(ϕ) rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ
= 1 +
(1− λ)1−σ
Ω
(
β¯
β∗i (ϕ)
)σ−k−1
. (37)
Combining (36) and (37), leads to the second segment of the Lorenz curve Q2(γ):
Q2(γ) = 1 +
(1− λ)1−σ
Ω
[1− γ]
k+1σ
k . (38)
Jointly, the Lorenz curve is described by
Q(γ) =

Q1(γ) if γ ∈ [0, b)Q2(γ) if γ ∈ [b, 1] , (39)
where b = 1−φk is the share of unregistered products produced by a firm. The Lorenz curve Q(γ)
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has the desired properties Q(0) = 0, Q(1) = 1, Q1(b) = Q2(b) and
∂Q(γ)
∂γ
> 0. The Gini-coefficient
follows from Gf = 1− 2
∫ 1
0 Q(γ)dγ:
Gf = Gi
{
2
Ω(σ − 1)
[
2k + 1− σ
2
[
Ω− 2φk
[
(1− δ)σ−1 +Ω
]]
−φ1+2k−σk
[
(1− λ)1−σ − (1− δ)σ−1
]
− (1− δ)σ−1(σ − 1− k)
]}
.
D Herfindahl index of formal firms
The revenue share of an unregistered product that is produced with product skill β of total firm
revenue is
s1(β) =
ri(ϕ, β)∫ β∗
f
(ϕ)
β∗i (ϕ)
ri(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ +
∫∞
β∗
f
(ϕ) rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ
=
(1− δ)σ
k + 1− σ
k
β∗i (ϕ)
1+k−σΩ−1βσ−1. (40)
Moreover, the revenue share of a registered product that is produced with product skill β of
total firm revenue is
s2(β) =
rf (ϕ, β)∫ β∗
f
(ϕ)
β∗i (ϕ)
ri(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ +
∫∞
β∗
f
(ϕ) rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ
=
(1− λ)1−σ
k + 1− σ
k
β∗i (ϕ)
1+k−σΩ−1βσ−1. (41)
The Herfindahl index results from the combination of the two:
Hf =
∫ β∗f (ϕ)
β∗i (ϕ)
s1(β)
2z(β)dβ +
∫ ∞
β∗
f
(ϕ)
s2(β)
2z(β)dβ = Hβ∗i (ϕ)
kΩ−2ω,
where ω ≡ (1− δ)2σ + φk+2−2σ
[
(1− λ)2−2σ − (1− δ)2σ
]
.
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E International trade
In this section I consider an extension of the model featuring international trade. Consider a world
of n+1 symmetric countries. Besides informality and formality, firms can choose to export a share
of their products to n countries. Export activities require the firm-level fixed costs Fx > Ff to
reflect the findings of Roberts and Tybout (1997) that fixed costs are critical determinants of export
participation. Intuitively, firms need not just register their firm, but face additional costs and time
requirements to comply with firm-level export regulations. Given the mounting empirical evidence
on the exclusion of informal firms from international trade (Batra et al., 2003; Bigsten et al., 2004;
La Porta and Shleifer, 2008), I proceed with the assumption that the registration for exporting
entails an intense government screening that leads to the probability of government enforcement
δ = 1 and accordingly renders informal production economically infeasible. To model the product
registration requirement and learning about export markets, I assume that firms incur a fixed cost
fx > ff for each exported product at the product-level. The transportation of products to foreign
markets is costly and modeled as variable iceberg cost τ > 1, that is for one good to arrive at the
destination country, τ goods have to be shipped. The product-level profits for exported goods are
therefore described by
pix(ϕ, β) = nτ
1−σR
σ
(
ρP
ϕ
1− λ
β
)σ−1
− fx. (42)
As firms have different product skills for the individual products they produce, this poses the
question which products will be exported. The empirical literature provides an answer to this
question (e.g. Iacovone and Javorcik, 2008; Bernard et al., 2011): core products, i.e. the products
the firm has the highest product skill in, are sold both at home and abroad. Peripheral products,
i.e. products that the firm has a low product skill in, are sold only at home. Mathematically, if
ff <
fxτ
σ−1
n
, then firms export high-product skill products and sell low-product skill products only
domestically.28 The condition corresponds to the firm-level condition for export participation in
Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2011).29
The firm-level profits and product skill threshold levels for informal and formal firms and im-
portant assumptions are as described in section 2.2. Exporting firms, however, cannot produce
goods informally. Therefore, the product skill threshold levels for domestic and exported products
β∗t (ϕ) and β
∗
x(ϕ), respectively, of exporting firms are determined by
pif (ϕ, β
∗
t (ϕ)) = 0 (43)
28I derive β∗t (ϕ) from pif (ϕ, β
∗
t (ϕ) = 0 and β
∗
x(ϕ) from pix(ϕ, β
∗
x(ϕ) = 0. Accordingly,
β∗t (ϕ) =
[
ffσ
R
] 1
σ−1
(ρP ϕ
1−λ
)−1 and β∗x(ϕ) =
[
fxσ
Rnτ1−σ
] 1
σ−1 (ρP ϕ
1−λ
)−1. To ensure β∗t (ϕ) < β
∗
x(ϕ), ff <
fxτ
σ−1
n
has to
hold.
29Notably, in this setup fx is a one-time payment independent of the number of export markets n to reflect
stringent product-regulation that occurs once for a product independent of the number of destination markets.
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and
pix(ϕ, β
∗
x(ϕ)) = 0. (44)
Notably, β∗t (ϕ) differs from β
∗
f (ϕ) in that β
∗
t (ϕ) is the threshold at which formal production
is economically feasible, whereas β∗f (ϕ) defines the threshold at which formal production is more
profitable than informal production of a product. Total profit of exporting firms therefore is
pix(ϕ) =
∫ ∞
β∗t (ϕ)
[
R
σ
(
ρP
ϕ
1− λ
β
)σ−1
− ff
]
z(β)dβ − Ff
+
∫ ∞
β∗x(ϕ)
[
nτ1−σR
σ
(
ρP
ϕ
1− λ
β
)σ−1
− fx
]
z(β)dβ − Fx. (45)
Firms now have four choices and maximize profit according to max {0, pii(ϕ), pif (ϕ), pix(ϕ)}.
That means they can either seize production, remain fully informal, register their firm, but evade
product regulation for a share of their products, or register their firm for domestic and export
activities and register their entire catalog of products. The empirical literature on trade and firm
productivity finds that high-productivity firms export and low-productivity firms only serve the
domestic market (e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Delgado et al., 2002;
Wagner, 2007). To capture this, the threshold level ϕ∗x above which firms decide to become exporters
is defined by
pif (ϕ
∗
x) = pix(ϕ
∗
x). (46)
In sum, if a firm draws a firm-level productivity below ϕ∗i , it will not produce at all. For a
draw above ϕ∗i , but below ϕ
∗
f , the firm becomes informal. For a draw above ϕ
∗
f , but below ϕ
∗
x the
firm becomes formal. Lastly, a draw above ϕ∗x leads the firm to become an exporter. The sorting
ϕ∗f < ϕ
∗
x is ensured if
[
Ff − Fi
Fx
] 1
k
[
(ff − fi)
σ−k−1
1−σ
(1− λ)k
[
f
σ−k−1
σ−1
f + (nτ
1−σ)
k
σ−1 f
σ−k−1
σ−1
x )
]
Ξ
k
1−σ
+
k
(1− σ)Ξ
[
1 + (1− δ)σ
[
φσ−k−1 − 1
]]
+
1− σ
(ff − fi)(σ − k − 1)
[
ff + fi
[
φ−k − 1
]]] 1k
< 1,
with Ξ ≡
[
(1− λ)1−σ − (1− δ)σ
]
. The condition follows from the combination of the formality
cutoff condition described by (15) and (46).
The share of the exported products of the continuum of products is described by 1−Z(β∗x(ϕ)) =
β∗x(ϕ)
−k. Similarly, the share of domestically sold products is determined by 1 − Z(β∗t (ϕ)) =
β∗t (ϕ)
−k. Therefore, I can express the share of exported relative to domestically sold products as
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(
β∗x
β∗t
)−k
=
[
fx
ff
] −k
σ−1
n
k
σ−1 τ−k. (47)
The results of a comparative statics analysis on (47) are intuitive. Factors that increase the
profitability of exporting (decrease in fx, τ or increase in n) or increase the cost of domestic sales
(increase in ff ) increase the relative share of exported products.
E.1 Product Scope
The number of distinct products produced by an exporting firm is determined by the probability of
drawing a product skill above the firm-specific product skill threshold of production. This follows
from
Kx(ϕ) = 1− Z(β
∗
t (ϕ)) = β
∗
t (ϕ)
−k. (48)
E.2 Product-Gini
The Lorenz curve that captures the product revenue distribution of exporters has two distinct
segments. The first segment considers only domestically sold products and the second steeper
segment captures the revenue generated from products that are sold both at home and abroad. I
first derive the share of products that are produced with a product skill below β¯ of the total number
of products a firm produces
γ =
∫ β¯
β∗t (ϕ)
βz(β)dβ∫ β∗x(ϕ)
β∗t (ϕ)
βz(β)dβ +
∫∞
β∗x(ϕ)
βz(β)dβ
= 1−
(
β¯
β∗t (ϕ)
)−k
(49)
The next step is calculating the revenue share of domestically sold products that are produced
with product skill below β¯ of total firm revenue:
Q1 =
∫ β¯
β∗t (ϕ)
rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ∫ β∗x(ϕ)
β∗t (ϕ)
rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ +
∫∞
β∗x(ϕ)
(1 + nτ1−σ)rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ
=
[(
β¯
β∗
f
(ϕ)
)σ−k−1
− 1
]
Ψ
, (50)
where ξ = (β∗t (ϕ)/β
∗
x(ϕ)) and Ψ ≡ 1 + nτ
1−σξk+1−σ. The first segment of the Lorenz curve is
Q1(γ) =
[
[1− γ]
k+1−σ
k − 1
]
Ψ
. (51)
The second segment consists of the goods that are also exported. The share of products that
are produced with a product skill below β¯ of all products is
γ =
∫ β∗x(ϕ)
β∗t (ϕ)
βz(β)dβ +
∫ β¯
β∗x(ϕ)
βz(β)dβ∫ β∗x(ϕ)
β∗t (ϕ)
βz(β)dβ +
∫∞
β∗x(ϕ)
βz(β)dβ
= 1−
(
β¯
β∗t (ϕ)
)−k
. (52)
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The share in revenue of the products that are also exported and produced with a product skill
below β¯ is
Q2 =
∫ β∗x(ϕ)
β∗t (ϕ)
ri(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ +
∫ β¯
β∗x(ϕ)
rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ∫ β∗x(ϕ)
β∗t (ϕ)
ri(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ +
∫∞
β∗x(ϕ)
(1 + nτ1−σ)rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ
= 1 +
(
β¯
β∗t (ϕ)
)σ−k−1
Ψ
. (53)
In combination they lead to the second segment of the Lorenz curve:
Q2(γ) = 1 +
[1− γ]
k+1σ
k
Ψ
. (54)
Jointly, the Lorenz curve is described by
Q(γ) =

Q1(γ) if γ ∈ [0, c)Q2(γ) if γ ∈ [c, 1] , (55)
where c = 1− ξk is the share of domestically sold goods relative to the share products that are also
exported. The Lorenz curve Q(γ) has the desired properties Q(0) = 0, Q(1) = 1, Q1(c) = Q2(c)
and ∂Q(γ)
∂γ
> 0. The Gini-coefficient follows from Gx = 1− 2
∫ 1
0 Q(γ)dγ:
Gx = G
{
2
Ψ(σ − 1)
[
2k + 1− σ
2
[
Ψ− 2ξk [Ψ + 1]
]
−ξ1+2k−σknτ1−σ − k
]}
. (56)
Gx depends on ξ, a proxy for the share of exported relative to only domestically sold products,
and Ψ that captures the skew of the product revenue distribution.
E.3 Herfindahl index
The Herfindahl index of exporting firms considers the revenue of two types of products: the products
only sold domestically and the products that are sold at home and abroad. The second group of
products, the ones also exported, generate a higher revenue due to the multiple markets they’re
sold in.
The revenue share st(β) of a domestically sold good product with product skill β of total firm
revenue is
st(β) =
rf (ϕ, β)∫ β∗x(ϕ)
β∗t (ϕ)
rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ +
∫∞
β∗x(ϕ)
(1 + nτ1−σ)rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ
=
k + 1− σ
k
β∗t (ϕ)
1+k−σΨ−1βσ−1. (57)
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Moreover, the revenue share sx(β) of a product that is also exported and produced with product
skill β of total firm revenue is
sx(β) =
(1 + nτ1−σ)rf (ϕ, β)∫ β∗x(ϕ)
β∗t (ϕ)
rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ +
∫∞
β∗x(ϕ)
(1 + nτ1−σ)rf (ϕ, β)z(β)dβ
=
(1 + nτ1−σ)
k + 1− σ
k
β∗f (ϕ)
1+k−σΨ−1βσ−1. (58)
The Herfindahl index results from the combination of the two:
Hx =
∫ β∗x(ϕ)
β∗t (ϕ)
st(β)
2z(β)dβ +
∫ ∞
β∗x(ϕ)
sx(β)
2z(β)dβ = Hβ∗t (ϕ)
kΨ−2ψ, (59)
where ψ ≡
[
1 + ξk+2−2σ
[
2nτ1−σ + n2τ2−2σ
]]
and Ψ−2ψ > 1.30
As in the case of firms that produce both unregistered and registered products, the Herfindahl
index for firms that export a share of their goods and sell some of their products only domestically
consists of three major components. First, H captures the product skill distribution and elasticity
of substitution between product varieties. β∗t (ϕ)
k reflects the number of products a firm produces
depending on its firm productivity ϕ. A higher firm productivity leads to a lower threshold, larger
number of products produced by a firm and a lower Herfindahl index.31 Lastly, Ψ−2ψ captures the
concentration of firm revenue among a few core products that are sold both at home and abroad
and therefore increases the Herfindahl index.
E.4 Comparisons
First, I compare diversification of exporting firms relative to informal and formal firms by comparing
product scope of the firms.
Ki(ϕi)
Kx(ϕx)
=
[
ff
fi
] k
σ−1
(1− δ)
σk
σ−1 (1− λ)k
(
ϕi
ϕx
)k
. (60)
Exporting firms produce all their goods in compliance with product-level regulations. Therefore,
the difference in product scope between informal and exporting firms depends besides their relative
productivity difference also on the costs and benefits of informal and formal production. The
two components work in opposite directions. First, exporting firms are higher-productivity firms
and are therefore able to produce goods at a lower product skill level. Therefore, the relative
productivity difference decreases the informal relative to the exporting product scope. Second,
evading product-level regulation allows firms to produce goods at a lower product skill and hence
30Ψ−2ψ > 1 holds if Ψ2 − ψ < 0. Rewriting leads to
n2τ2−2σξk+2−2σ
[
ξk − 1
]
+ 2nτ1−σξk+1−σ
[
1− ξ1−σ
]
< 0, which holds because ξ ∈ (0, 1) and 1− σ < 0.
31Substituting for β∗t (ϕ) leads to Hx(ϕ) = H
[
ffσ
R
] k
σ−2
(ρP ϕ
1−λ
)−kΨ−2ψ and accordingly ∂Hx(ϕ)
∂ϕ
< 0.
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increases the informal relative to the formal product scope.32
Kf (ϕf )
Kx(ϕx)
=
[
ff
fi
] k
σ−1
(1− δ)
σk
σ−1 (1− λ)k
(
ϕf
ϕx
)k
. (61)
As formal firms can evade product registration, the product scope of formal relative to ex-
porting firms is the same as the previous relationship between informal and exporting firms and
consists of the same two components. Comparing the lowest-productivity exporting firm and the
highest-productivity formal firm, i.e. (ϕf/ϕx) = 1, shows that export participation entails less
diversification, as measured by product scope, for the marginal exporter.
Second, I compare diversification between the different firms using the Product-level Gini.
Gi
Gx
=
[
2
Ψ(σ − 1)
]−1 [2k + 1− σ
2
[
Ψ− 2
[
1− ξk
]
− 2ξkΨ
]
+ knτ1−σξ2k+1−σ + k
]−1
< 1. (62)
Exporting firms produce all their goods in compliance with product regulation, however, the
majority of their revenue stems from core goods that are sold domestically and abroad. ξ captures
this as a proxy for the share of products sold domestically relative to the ones that are also exported.
The intuition is as follows. When a select group of core products generate the majority of firm
revenue, in this case the goods that are also exported, firms are less diversified than when all goods
are sold only domestically. Therefore, Gi/Gx < 1 and informal firms are more diversified than
exporting firms.33
Gf
Gx
=
[
Gi
Gf
]−1 [Gi
Gx
]
. (63)
Measured by the Product-Gini, formal non-exporting firms may or may not be more diversified
than exporting firms. As the Product-Gini is a relative measure, the absolute number of products
produced by each firm does not matter and hence firm productivity does not influence this measure
of diversification. The two components that matter are the extent to which non-exporting firms’
revenue is concentrated among registered products versus the extent to which exporting firms’ rev-
enue is concentrated among the core products that are sold domestically and exported. Depending
on which of the two components dominates, non-exporting firms are more or less diversified than
exporting firms. To demonstrate that Gf/Gx can be smaller or greater than 1, I compute the nu-
merical value of the key variables for two scenarios as shown in table 1. The first scenario considers
a world consisting of only home and abroad. The second scenario assumes three foreign countries.
All parameters are within the constraints of the model.
Lastly, I compare product diversification of firms using the Herfindahl index.
32Given an earlier assumption, (1−λ)
1−σ
(1−δ)σ
<
ff
fi
holds. Rewriting leads to (ff/fi)
k
σ−1 (1− δ)
σk
σ−1 (1− λ)k > 1.
33 Gi
Gx
< 1 if 2
Ψ(σ−1)
[
2k+1−σ
2
[
Ψ− 2
[
1− ξk
]
− 2ξkΨ
]
+ knτ1−σξ2k+1−σ + k
]
> 1.
The condition can be rewritten as (k + 1− σ)nτ1−σ
[
ξk+1−σ − ξ2k+1−σ
]
> 0. Because ξ ∈ (0, 1), k + 1− σ > 0 and
k > 1 the condition holds and the Product-Gini of informal firms is lower than the one of exporting formal firms.
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Table 1: Economy parameters for two scenarios.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Total workforce L 1.0 1.0
Elasticity of substitution σ 3.4 3.4
Product skill distribution parameter k 5.0 5.0
Formal fixed cost Ff 4.0 4.0
Informal fixed cost Fi 1.0 1.0
Exporting fixed cost Fx 10.0 10.0
Formal fixed cost ff 4.0 4.0
Informal fixed cost fi 1.0 1.0
Exporting fixed cost fx 10.0 10.0
Productivity bonus λ 0.3 0.3
Probability of detection δ 0.1 0.1
Iceberg transportation cost τ 1.4 1.4
Number of foreign countries n 1 3
Gf
Gx
1.36 0.94
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Hi(ϕi)
Hx(ϕx)
=
[
fi
ff
] k
σ−1
(1− δ)
−kσ
σ−1 (1− λ)−kΨ2ψ−1
(
ϕx
ϕi
)k
. (64)
The diversification of informal relative to exporting firms measured by the Herfindahl index
consists of three components. As before, the first component is the relative productivity difference
ϕx/ϕi. Second, as informal firms evade product regulation for all and exporting firms for none of
their products, the diversification ratio depends also on the relative costs and benefits of evasion of
versus compliance with product regulation [fi/ff ]
k
σ−1 (1− δ)
−kσ
σ−1 (1−λ)−k. The evasion of product-
level regulation allows firms to produce goods at a lower product skill and therefore more overall
products. As a result, this component indicates a higher relative diversification of informal firms.34
Lastly, Ψ2ψ−1 captures the fact that exporting firms sell their core products domestically and
abroad. The concentration of firm revenue on a few core products entails a less equal product
revenue distribution and accordingly a higher Herfindahl index. In sum, given the same firm
productivity, informal firms are more diversified than exporting firms.
Hf (ϕf )
Hx(ϕx)
=
[
fi
ff
] k
σ−1
(1− δ)
−kσ
σ−1 (1− λ)−kΨ2ψ−1Ω−2ω
(
ϕx
ϕf
)k
. (65)
Lastly, comparing formal non-exporting and exporting firms brings all the previous components
together. On the one hand, the ability of non-exporting firms to produce informally, captured by
[fi/ff ]
k
σ−1 (1 − δ)
−kσ
σ−1 (1 − λ)−k, and the revenue concentration of exporting firms on core prod-
ucts, Ψ2ψ−1, indicate a higher diversification of non-exporting relative to exporting firms. On the
other hand, the revenue concentration on formal products of non-exporting firms, Ω−2ω, and the
productivity difference between exporting and non-exporting firms, ϕx/ϕf > 1, indicates a lower
diversification of non-exporting relative to exporting firms. The result is ambiguous.
34Given an earlier assumption, (1−λ)
1−σ
(1−δ)σ
<
ff
fi
holds. Rewriting leads to (fi/ff )
k
σ−1 (1− δ)
−σk
σ−1 (1− λ)−k < 1.
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F Firm-level regulation without product-level regulation
This section considers the model setup without product-level regulation, along the lines of Becker
(2014). Firms only face firm-level fixed cost Ff , but can evade the registration fee and become
informal by paying fixed cost Fi < Ff just to set up shop. Firms aiming to export have to
pay Fx > Ff , which reflects the additional costs of learning about export markets as well as
export regulations. This captures the finding of Roberts and Tybout (1997) that sunk costs are
critical determinants of export participation. As there are no boundaries to the profitability of the
production of each product, every firm produces all products of the continuum. Notably, variables
with subscript x describe export activities and pix(ϕ) is the firm-level profit of exporting that firms
receive in addition to their domestic profit. The informal, formal and exporting profit of a firm
with productivity ϕ respectively are
pii(ϕ) =
∫ ∞
1
[
(1− δ)σ
R
σ
(ρPϕβ)σ−1
]
z(β)dβ − Fi, (66)
pif (ϕ) =
∫ ∞
1
[
R
σ
(
ρP
ϕ
1− λ
β
)σ−1]
z(β)dβ − Ff (67)
and
pix(ϕ) =
∫ ∞
1
[
nτ1−σR
σ
(
ρP
ϕ
1− λ
β
)σ−1]
z(β)dβ − Fx. (68)
The threshold levels ϕ∗i and ϕ
∗
f are determined as in section 2.2 by (14) and (15) and informal
sector firms are lower-productivity firms than formal sector firms. The sorting ϕ∗i < ϕ
∗
f is ensured
if (1−λ)
1−σ
(1−δ)σ <
Ff
Fi
.35 Notably, the condition is equivalent to the corresponding one in Becker (2014).
In addition to the cutoff productivity levels defined by (14) and (15), firms are able to export
and do so if exporting leads to positive profits. The threshold level ϕ∗x above which firms decide to
become exporters is defined by
pix(ϕ
∗
x) = 0. (69)
Export activities are conducted by firms in addition to their domestic sales. That means firms
maximize their profit by deciding on max {0, pii(ϕ), pif (ϕ), pif (ϕ) + pix(ϕ)}. The empirical literature
on firm-level productivity and exporting finds that higher-productivity firms export and lower-
productivity firms supply only the domestic market (Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999; Delgado et al.,
2002; Wagner, 2007). This sorting of ϕ∗f < ϕ
∗
x is ensured if
[Ff−Fi]
1
σ−1
[(1−λ)1−σ−(1−δ)σ ]
1
σ−1
< F
1
σ−1
x τ
n
1
σ−1 (1−λ)−1
.36
35The condition results from the assumption that informal firms break even at a lower productivity level than formal
firms. Breaking even at a lower productivity requires that ϕ∗i < ϕ
∗
f for ϕ
∗
i from pii(ϕ
∗
i ) = 0 & ϕ
∗
f from pif (ϕ
∗
f ) = 0.
ϕ∗i =
[
Fiσ
(1−δ)σR
] 1
σ−1
(ρP )
[
k+1−σ
k
] 1
σ−1 and ϕ∗f =
[
Ffσ
R
] 1
σ−1
(ρP )
1
1−λ
[
k+1−σ
k
] 1
σ−1 . Hence, (1−λ)
1−σ
(1−δ)σ
<
Ff
Fi
. Since both
profit functions are monotonically increasing in productivity, a single crossing of the profit functions is ensured and
the productivity sorting is achieved.
36Ensuring ϕ∗x > ϕ
∗
f for ϕ
∗
f from pii(ϕ
∗
f ) = pif (ϕ
∗
f ) and ϕ
∗
x from pix(ϕ
∗
x) = 0 is sufficient to sort domestic productivity
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Intuitively, only if the cost benefit ratio of formality is lower than the one of exporting, only the
highest-productivity firms will export. This condition also corresponds to Becker (2014).
The share of informal and formal firms in an economy is equal to the probability of drawing
a productivity above the respective threshold level. Specifically, the share of formal firms is 1 −
G(ϕ∗f ) = ϕ
∗−k
f and the share of informal firms follows from G(ϕ
∗
f )−G(ϕ
∗
i ) = ϕ
∗−k
i − ϕ
∗−k
f . Using
(14) and (15), I derive the number of informal relative to formal firms depending only on the policy
parameters:
ϕ∗−αi − ϕ
∗−α
f
ϕ∗−αf
=
[
Fi
Ff − Fi
] −α
σ−1
[
(1− λ)1−σ
(1− δ)σ
− 1
] −α
σ−1
− 1. (70)
The effect of changing these parameters is intuitive. For an increase in factors that decrease
formal sector profitability relative to the informal sector (increase in Ff or decrease in λ, δ, Fi),
the relative share of informal firms‘ increases.
F.1 Product Scope
Since there are is no product-level regulation in place, the minimum product skill threshold equals
the lower limit of product skill draws, i.e. 1. Thus, all firms produce all products.37 Moreover, as
all firms produce all products, product scope is equal for informal, formal and exporting firms.
F.2 Product-Gini
First, I derive the number of products with product skill below β¯ relative to the total amount of
products:
γ =
∫ β¯
1 βz(β)dβ∫∞
1 βz(β)dβ
= 1− β¯−k. (71)
Next, the revenue share of products with product skill below β¯ of total firm revenue is
Q =
∫ β¯
1 r(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ∫∞
1 r(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ
= 1− β¯σ−k−1. (72)
Lastly, both equations can be combined to calculate the Lorenz curve
Q(γ) = 1− [1− γ]
σ−k−1
−k (73)
and the Product-Gini
levels below export productivity levels. This results in
ϕ∗f = (Ff − Fi)
1
σ−1
[
R
σ
] 1
1−σ
[
(1−λ)1−σ−(1−δ)σ
(1−δ)σ
] 1
1−σ [ k+1−σ
k
] 1
σ−1 (ρP )−1 and
ϕ∗x = F
1
σ−1
x
[
R
σ
] 1
1−σ n
1
1−σ τ(1− λ)
[
k+1−σ
k
] 1
σ−1 (ρP )−1. In combination,
[Ff−Fi]
1
σ−1
[(1−λ)1−σ−(1−δ)σ]
1
σ−1
< F
1
σ−1
x τ
n
1
σ−1 (1−λ)−1
.
37Mathematically: K(ϕ) = 1− Z(1) = 1.
31
G = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
Q(γ)dγ =
σ − 1
2k + 1− σ
. (74)
Because the relative revenue shares are not affected by the sector choice, the derivation of the
Product-Gini is the same for all firms and the product revenue distribution follows the Pareto
product skill distribution. Given its relative nature, G is independent of firm productivity ϕ.
Therefore, all firms are equally diversified as measured by the Product-Gini. Moreover, product
diversification measured by the Product-Gini is increasing in the elasticity of substitution σ.38
F.3 Herfindahl Index
The revenue share s(β) of a product produced with product skill β of total firm revenue is
s(β) =
r(ϕ, β)∫∞
1 r(ϕ, β)z(β)dβ
=
k + 1− σ
k
βσ−1 (75)
and the Herfindahl index follows from
H =
∫ ∞
1
s(β)2z(β)dβ =
(k + 1− σ)2
k(k + 2− 2σ)
. (76)
This derivation follows the same procedure for informal, formal and exporting firms, as sector
specific differences do not influence the relative revenue shares. Moreover, all firms produce the
whole continuum of products. Therefore, all firms are equally diversified, as measured by the
Herfindahl index, and diversification is increasing in the elasticity of substitution σ.39
38 ∂G
∂σ
= 2k
(σ−2k−1)2
> 0.
39 ∂H
∂σ
= −2k(k+1−σ)(k+2−2σ)+2k(2k+2−2σ)
k2(k+2−2σ)2
> 0, because σ > 1.
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